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Abstract In the late nineteenth century, European philosophical theologians concerned
about the perceived threat of secularity played a crucial role in the construction of the
category of ‘religion,’ conceived as a transcultural universal, the genus of which the so-
called ‘world religions’ are species. By reading the work of the late John Hick (1922–
2012), the most influential contemporary philosophical advocate of religious pluralism,
through an historically informed hermeneutic of suspicion, this paper argues that
orientalist-derived understandings of religion continue to play a significant (though
often unacknowledged) role within the philosophy of religion today. Though couched
in the language of pluralism, Hick’s later work in the philosophy of religion functions
apologetically to maintain a version of the religious–secular distinction that, while
theologically and politically loaded, is, I show, philosophically arbitrary. Moving the
philosophy of religion beyond Eurocentrism, I argue, will require freeing it from the
logic of the modern understanding of religion.
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In the late nineteenth century, European philosophical theologians concerned about the
perceived threat of secularity played a crucial role in the construction of the category of
‘religion,’ conceived as a transcultural universal, the genus of which the so-called ‘world
religions’ are species. By reading the work of the late John Hick (1922–2012), the most
influential contemporary philosophical advocate of religious pluralism, through an histori-
cally informed hermeneutic of suspicion, this paper argues that orientalist-derived under-
standings of religion continue to play a significant (though often unacknowledged) role
within the philosophy of religion today. Though couched in the language of pluralism,
Hick’s later work in the philosophy of religion functions apologetically tomaintain a version
of the religious–secular distinction that, while theologically and politically loaded, is, I show,
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philosophically arbitrary. Moving the philosophy of religion beyond Eurocentrism, I argue,
will require freeing it from the logic of the modern understanding of religion.
From the perspective of mainstream analytic philosophy of religion, my approach in
this paper may seem somewhat unorthodox; employing a broadly genealogical method,
I begin with a fairly lengthy discussion of the intellectual history of some key concepts
in contemporary pluralistic philosophy of religion, including categories like the ‘world
religions.’Drawing especially from the work of Charles Taylor and TomokoMasuzawa,
I argue that these categories are best understood as part of an emerging self-
understanding of ‘the West’ as ‘secular.’ It is within this historical trajectory that I then
attempt to situation Hick's ‘pluralistic hypothesis’ that ‘the great post-axial faiths
constitute different ways of experiencing, conceiving and living in relation to an ultimate
divine Reality which transcends all our varied visions of it.’1 Rather than engaging
Hick's work directly on its own terms, I read it across the grain, attempting to show how
it functions, in seeming tension with its stated purpose, to maintain certain Western/
Christian assumptions. I conclude with a sort of open-ended and admittedly rather
schematic manifesto for a more genuinely pluralistic approach to the discipline.
World Religions
To begin, consider the following picture: in the world today, there is a finite number of world
religions. There is some disagreement about which religions qualify asworld religions—that
is to say, ‘great’ or ‘major traditions’—but asmany as 11 are typically judged tomake the cut.
2 Although classified under one of two headings—variously construed asWestern vs. Eastern
traditions, prophetic vs. wisdom traditions, etc.—each of these major traditions is a token of
the same type, namely, religion. Religion is a human universal, but it takes many forms, as a
result of the differences among cultures. The result is a geographical (and quasi-racial)
distribution of religion's varying forms, including those characteristic of China, India, the
Middle East, and Europe. However, although these differences should be respected, perhaps
even ‘celebrated,’ they are ultimately less significant than the similarities.
Though something of a composite sketch, the foregoing description is, I think, a fair
characterization of the picture of religion with which most college-educated Americans
operate.3 It should certainly be familiar to anyonewho has taken (or taught) a course, or read
a textbook, onworld religions, but it is not themental mapwithwhich earlier generations of
Westerners operated. During the Middle Ages, the Latin term religio functioned rather
differently, not as the name of a genus of which Christianity was a species, but as a
synonym for ‘piety’ or to designate clergy in orders.4 Indeed, as David Chidester points out,
prior to the Reformation, ‘the word in English did not have a plural.’5 The term ‘world
1 John Hick, An interpretation of religion: human responses to the transcendent (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1989), 235–6.
2 These include Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Sikhism, Zoroastrianism, Taoism, Confucianism, Shinto,
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.
3 Throughout this essay, I focus on the USA, because it is the context I know best; however, I suspect that
analogous points could be made about other Western understandings.
4 See William Cavanaugh, The myth of religious violence: secular ideology and the roots of modern conflict
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 65.
5 David Chidester, Christianity: a global history (New York: HarperCollins, 2000), 344.
480 R. Amesbury
religion’ was similarly first used in the singular, in reference to Christianity; non-Christian
traditions were at best ‘national religions,’ i.e., nonuniversal religions peculiar to specific
geographical regions or people groups.6 Up through themid-nineteenth century, as Tomoko
Masuzawa notes, Europeans ‘had a well-established convention for categorizing the
peoples of the world into four parts, rather unequal in size and uneven in specificity,
namely, Christians, Jews, Mohammedans (as Muslims were commonly called then), and
the rest. The last part, the rest, comprised those variously known as heathens, pagans,
idolaters, or sometimes polytheists.’7 The displacement of this earlier taxonomy by the
world religions schema might be assumed to represent ‘a turn away from the Eurocentric
and Eurohegemonic conception of the world, toward a more egalitarian and lateral
delineation,’ but the historical developments that explain this discursive shift require a
more nuanced and critical assessment.8 Of particular significance is the emergence of a new
self-understanding of the West as secular.
Secularization
Ours is widely regarded as a secular age, but what exactly does that mean? While it is
something of a truism that the present differs in important ways from the past, there is today
little agreement among scholars of secularization as to precisely what has changed, or why.
The result is that different thinkers use the term ‘secularization’ in quite different ways. One
influential version of secularization theory defines secularization as the emancipation of
once-religious domains of life from ecclesial oversight and the resulting structural differen-
tiation of society into distinct ‘spheres’—the state, the economy, medicine, education—each
governed by its own criteria. A good example of this kind of structural differentiation is
provided by the separation of church and state in liberal democracies. It is in this sense of the
term ‘secular’ that we can speak of the USA, France, and India as all being ‘secular states,’
despite varying levels and forms of belief and practice.
According to a second and importantly different account, secularization refers to a
decline in belief and practice, e.g., to people no longer believing in God or attending
church. As many scholars have pointed out, there is no necessary connection between
secularization in the first sense and secularization in the second. Consider the USA,
‘One of the earliest societies to separate Church and State, it is also the Western society
with the highest statistics for religious belief and practice.’9 Secularization as religious
decline was widely discussed during the 1960s, but in recent years the theory has been
subjected to significant criticism, and many of the sociologists and theologians who
formerly championed the death of God have retracted their obituaries. Peter Berger,
who once predicted that by ‘the 21st century, religious believers are likely to be found
only in small sects, huddled together to resist a worldwide secular culture,’10 now
6 Tomoko Masuzawa, The invention of world religions: or, how European Universalism was preserved in the
language of pluralism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 23.
7 Masuzawa, xi.
8 Masuzawa, 13.
9 Charles Taylor, A secular age, (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 2007), 2.
10 Peter Berger, ‘A bleak outlook is seen for religion,’ New York Times (25 April 1968), 3. Quoted in Rodney
Stark and Roger Finke, Acts of faith: explaining the human side of religion (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2000), 58.
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concedes that ‘the world today, with some exceptions…, is as furiously religious as it
ever was, and in some places more so than ever.’11 However, the thesis of religious
decline continues to enjoy the support of a number of influential sociologists, and when
suitably qualified—as a theory about the state of Christian churches in parts of Western
Europe, for instance—it is worthy of serious consideration.
In his recent book A secular age, Charles Taylor identifies a third sense of secular-
ization, which has to do with the conditions for, rather than the extent of, belief.12 ‘The
shift to secularity in this sense consists, among other things, of a move from a society
where belief in God is unchallenged and indeed, unproblematic, to one in which it is
understood to be one option among others, and frequently not the easiest to embrace.’13
As Steve Bruce has put it, ‘the position of the modern believer is quite unlike that of the
Christian of the Middle Ages in that, while we may still believe, we cannot avoid the
knowledge that many people (including many people like us) believe differently.’14 To
suggest, in this third sense, that ours is a secular age is to say not that belief is declining
per se, but that no single perspective—whether ‘religious’ or otherwise—enjoys the
status of a ‘default option.’ Believers of varying stripes jostle with one another and with
‘unbelievers’15—not just in society at large, but within families and among friends—
and individuals sometimes find themselves conflicted and uncertain.16 It is seculariza-
tion in this third register that Taylor takes as his focus.
In order to appreciate what is distinctive about Taylor's account, it will help to contrast
it with two other ways of telling the story. According to the first of these, which Taylor
calls ‘subtraction theories,’ secularity is what is left over after human beings have
managed to liberate themselves from the illusions or epistemic limitations of their
religious past. One common variant of this view attributes secularization to the rise of
modern science and the disenchantment of the universe. The history of secularization is on
this account a story of progress, which can be told only from the perspective of those who
have already achieved its final enlightened telos.17 As Freud put it in The future of an
11 Peter L. Berger, ‘The desecularization of the world: a global overview,’ in The Descularization of the world:
resurgent religion and world politics, ed. Berger (Washington, D.C.:Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1999), 2.
12 The remainder of this section is borrowed from my critical notice of A secular age in Philosophical
Investigations 33:1 (January 2010): 67–74. Permission to reprint is kindly granted by John Wiley and Sons.
13 Taylor, 3.
14 Steve Bruce, God is dead: secularization in the west (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 18. Bruce is developing a
point made by Peter Berger in The heretical imperative: contemporary possibilities of religious affirmation
(London: Collins).
15 The scare quotes here are meant to signal that the term ‘unbelievers’ is tendentious—everyone believes
something.
16 Taylor writes, ‘This mutual fragilization of all the different views in presence, the undermining sense that
others think differently, is certainly one of the main features of the world of 2000, in contrast to that of 1500.’
Taylor, 303–304.
17 These supposed developments can of course be given a theological gloss. For example, Hegel claimed that ‘[t]he
development and advance of Spirit from the time of the Reformation onwards consist in this, that Spirit, having now
gained the consciousness of its Freedom, through that process of mediation which takes place between man and
God—that is, in the full recognition of the objective process as the existence of the Divine essence—now takes it up
and follows it out in building up the edifice of secular relations.’GeorgWilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The philosophy of
history, trans. J. Sibree (New York: Dover, 1956), p. 422. More recently, and from a very different philosophical
paradigm, Gianni Vattimo has argued that, ‘[i]f it is the mode in which the weakening of Being realizes itself as the
kenosis of God, which is the kernel of the history of salvation, secularization shall no longer be conceived of as
abandonment of religion but as the paradoxical realization of Being's religious vocation.’ Gianni Vattimo, After
Christianity, trans. Luca D'Isanto (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), p. 24.
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illusion, ‘a turning-away from religion is bound to occur with the fatal inevitability of a
process of growth.’18 Against this kind of story, Taylor argues that ‘Western modernity,
including its secularity, is the fruit of new inventions, newly constructed self-
understandings and related practices, and can't be explained in terms of perennial features
of human life.’19 On Taylor's view, secularization involves the displacement of one social
imaginary by another or, rather, a series of such displacements. However natural and
unremarkable it may seem to us, secularity had to be constructed.
This latter view—that secularity was constructed not discovered—is shared by a second
kind of account with which Taylor's view can, in certain other respects, also be contrasted.
This is the view developed by John Milbank and associated with Radical Orthodoxy. On
this account, secularization is the outgrowth of an intellectual error, a theological mistake.
The culprit, onMilbank's version of the story, is Duns Scotus, whose ‘univocal’ conception
of being collapsed the difference in kind between God and creatures into a difference in
degree. From there, it was a slippery slope to deism, Hume's Dialogues, and Richard
Dawkins. Taylor calls this view the ‘intellectual deviation’ story. In contrast to subtraction
theorists, who associate secularization with progress, deviation theorists regard it as decline.
Taylor acknowledges that some such theological developmentsmay be part of the story, but
he argues that they cannot be the whole, or even the most important part, of it. Milbank's
account is far too intellectualist to explain how secularity ‘emerges as a mass phenome-
non.’20 As a different critic of Radical Orthodoxy, Jeffrey Stout, puts the point, ‘Intellectual
errors do sometimes have significant social and political consequences, but history rarely
works in the theory-driven way that philosophers and theologians imagine.’21
It is also clear that Taylor's tone differs importantly from that of Milbank and other
theological critics of secularity. Readers of A secular age will detect none of the
nostalgia for the past or denunciation of the present that characterize much Radical
Orthodoxy. While there are many features of our times of which Taylor is critical, he
seems on the whole to think that the trade-offs have worked to our advantage. ‘Even if
we had a choice,’ he writes, ‘I'm not sure we wouldn't be wiser to stick with the present
dispensation.’22 Contemporary forms of ‘spirituality’ and religious life, though prone to
distinctive and familiar kinds of corruption, are not necessarily as frivolous and self-
indulgent as their detractors like to make out, and in any case, there is no possibility of
turning back the clock.
Indeed, if the story Taylor tells is correct, there is something ironic about efforts by
theologians to reform our wayward age; for on Taylor's account, it was precisely the
drive by elites to make better Christians of the masses that helped to produce a secular
age in the first place: religious Reform, not science or an intellectual error, is the engine
that drives secularization. As David Martin puts it, ‘Christians have raised the bar about
what it means to be a Christian, and so inhibited the take-up.’ 23 The Protestant
18 Sigmund Freud, The future of an illusion, trans. and ed. James Strachey (New York: W.W. Norton, 1961
[1927]), 55.
19 Taylor, 22. Many secularization theorists would agree. For instance, Steve Bruce insists that ‘what people
are “essentially” like, stripped of their culture and history, is unknowable, because we are all products of
culture and history.’ Bruce, 42.
20 Taylor, 775.
21 Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 101.
22 Taylor, 513.
23 David Martin, On secularization: Towards a revised general theory (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 119.
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Reformation is one example of what Taylor calls ‘Reform’ (with a capital R), but it was
hardly an isolated phenomenon. Beginning in the Middle Ages and continuing down
through the temperance movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Christian
reformers undertook the challenge of disciplining and reordering society, purging it (as
best they could) not simply of perceived vices like the dancing, drinking, and sex that
attended community festivals like Carnival, but also of the ‘superstitions’ and ‘ex-
cesses’ of popular religion. This process naturally generated resentment toward
Christianity's institutional forms and its clergy, which in turn helped to facilitate the
emergence in the eighteenth century of what Taylor calls ‘exclusive humanism,’ but it
also gave rise to new forms of Christianity characterized by discipline and disenchant-
ment. As Taylor puts it, ‘the interesting story is not simply one of decline, but also of a
new placement of the sacred or spiritual in relation to individual and social life. This
new placement is now the occasion for recompositions of spiritual life in new forms,
and for new ways of existing both in and out of relation to God.’24 Rooted as they were
in historical contingencies, these developments were far from linear and resulted in
very different outcomes in different countries, generations, economic and social classes,
professions, political systems, etc.
During what Taylor calls the ‘expressivist revolutions’ of the 1960s, with their
emphasis on authenticity and self-realization, the pendulum swung back the other
direction, away from the buffered identities and moral discipline characteristic of
Reform, breaking the link between Christianity and civilizational order in the West.
This has had the effect of weakening certain forms of religiosity (those Taylor calls neo-
Durkheimian) and strengthening others (the post-Durkheimian, in which religion is
disconnected from national or political identity). The familiar result—dramatized by
Robert Wuthnow's distinction between ‘seeking’ and ‘dwelling’ 25—is two distinct
sensibilities: ‘those which underlie respectively the new kinds of spiritual quest, on
one side, and the prior option for an authority which forecloses them on the other.’26
No doubt most people find themselves somewhere between these ideal types, but it
also is possible to live one's life outside what we have come to call religion. A recent
survey by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life found that ‘one-fifth of the U.S.
public—and a third of adults under 30—are religiously unaffiliated.’27 Moreover, immi-
gration (particularly what Martin calls the ‘migratory backflow of empire’ 28), while
serving to revitalize and ‘de-Europeanize’ American Christianity, is also contributing to
the diversification of America's religious landscape.29 ‘For example, Muslims, roughly
two-thirds of whom are immigrants, now account for roughly 0.6 % of the U.S. adult
population; and Hindus, more than eight-in-ten of whom are foreign born, now account
for approximately 0.4 % of the population.’30 These percentages may seem small, but the
expansion of America's traditionally Protestant denominational structure to include first
24 Taylor, 437.
25 See Robert Wuthnow, After heaven: spirituality in America since the 1950s (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1998), 3ff.
26 Taylor, 512.
27 The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, “‘Nones” on the Rise’ (9 October 2012), 9.
28 Martin, 71.
29 See José Casanova, Public religions in the modern world (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994),
154ff.
30 The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, ‘U.S. religious landscape survey: religious beliefs and
practices: diverse and politically relevant’ (June 2008), p. 8.
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Catholics, then Jews, and now Muslims and Hindus is altering how Americans think
about themselves, and what they believe about each others' beliefs. According to another
Pew study, 70% of Americans now believe that ‘many religions can lead to eternal life.’31
The net effect of the past five centuries is not, for Taylor, the withering away of
belief in the West, but a shift in its conditions—of what it is to believe. The character-
istic feature of our secular age is what Taylor calls its ‘immanent frame’: life is lived
within a self-sufficient, ‘natural’ order, which can be explained and ‘envisaged without
reference to God.’32 God is manifest neither in discrete instances of the sacred (as
distinct from the profane) nor in the moral order on which civilization is said to depend.
To say that the world can be understood apart from God is not, however, to say that it
must be understood as closed to transcendence—for the immanent frame can be
conceived as open to something beyond itself. Indeed, the modern distinction between
the natural and the supernatural—like the modern conception of a miracle as a violation
of a law of nature—belongs to the immanent frame, to a world imagined in terms of an
order from which God's presence has been withdrawn.33
Internal Relations
Secularization is typically understood as a theory about what has happened to religion in
the West under conditions of modernity. Although scholars disagree in terms of the
answers they give—differentiation, privatization, decline, etc.—the fact that they are
capable of debating them suggests that they are agreed as to the nature of the question.
Of course, much of the disagreement over the state of religion in modernity revolves
around how religion ought to be understood, but the almost universal assumption in the
literature is that the term can, and indeed must, be defined independently of ‘seculariza-
tion.’ The thesis that secularization involves religious decline, for example, presupposes
some independent conception of religion in terms of which this putative decline is to be
measured. What is often overlooked, however, is that historically, the origins of the term
‘secular’ predate the development of our contemporary understanding of religion. Indeed,
my suggestion here is that the construction of secularity—and perhaps more importantly,
the development of various teleological discourses of secularization through which these
processes were interpreted34—is what gave rise to the category of religion that most
scholars today take for granted. The hypothesis I'd like for us to entertain is that the key
elements of secularization—religion, secularity, modernity, and the West—are connected
31 The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, ‘U.S. religious landscape survey,’ p. 4.
32 Taylor, 543.
33 Whereas the late medieval distinction between the natural and the ‘supernatural’ was intended by the
nominalists and the Protestant Reformers to secure the autonomy of the supernatural against the natural, the
modern distinction performs the reverse function. Taylor, 542.
34 These latter discourses may in fact have served to hasten the onset of secularization in Europe. Casanova
has argued that ‘[w]e need to entertain seriously the proposition that secularization became a self-fulfilling
prophecy in Europe once large sectors of the population ofWestern European societies, including the Christian
churches, accepted the basic premises of the theory of secularization; that secularization is a teleological
process of modern social change; that the more modern a society, the more secular it becomes; and that
secularity is “a sign of the times.”’ José Casanova, ‘Immigration and the new religious pluralism,’ in
Secularism, religion and multicultural citizenship, ed. Geoffrey Brahm Levey and Tariq Modood
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 144.
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not merely externally, as conventional social-scientific accounts of secularization assume,
but internally (or conceptually).
During theMiddle Ages, the secular was contrasted not with religion as we understand
it today, but with the sacred, a distinction which originally had to do with the experience
of time. In medieval Latin, the word saeculum meant ‘age’ or ‘century.’ Whereas ‘we
moderns’ 35 apprehend ourselves to be moving chronologically through what Walter
Benjamin called ‘homogeneous, empty time,’ medieval Christians, as Benedict
Anderson has noted, ‘had no conception of history as an endless chain of cause and
effect or of radical separations between past and present.’36 The distinction between the
secular and the sacred marked the difference between ordinary times and kairotic times—
those moments of history linked vertically (simultaneously) to eternity, rather than
horizontally (sequentially), through the causal relation of one event to the next.37 For
the medievals, as José Casanova points out, there were in reality three times, not two—
‘the eternal age of God and the temporal-historical age, which is itself divided into the
sacred-spiritual time of salvation, represented by the church's calendar, and the secular age
proper (saeculum).’38 What was lost in the transition to modernity was not the distinction
between history and eternity—between the respective times of this world and the next—
but the divisionwithin history between kairoi and chronoi: for ‘us moderns,’ all history is
experienced as secular time. This collapsing of categories—motivated in part by the
efforts of ‘Reformers’ to hold all Christians to the same high standards, thus breaking
down the medieval hierarchy of vocations39—made it possible to use the term ‘secular’ in
a new way, as contrasted not with the sacred, but with the entire system within which the
earlier distinction had its life. The upshot is that religion as we tend to think of it today—a
concept that generalizes outward from the experience of European Christians—was
discovered by Europeans just as it seemed to be receding in the West.40
The emerging discourse of religion was, among other things, a ‘discourse of othering,’
which permitted an invidious contrast between the rational, progressive West and the
religious (and comparatively backward) rest, i.e., those regions of the world over against
which the imagined community of Europe was in the process of constructing a collective
identity. For this reason, subtraction theories of secularization played a critical role in the
development of two new sciences of cultural difference: orientalism and anthropology.41
Whereas the former concerned itself with the ‘great civilizations of the East,’ especially their
35 This account of the modern experience of time is an oversimplification, which occludes what Homi Bhabha
calls ‘disjunctive temporality’ – the uneasy coming together of varying ‘times.’ See Homi K. Bhabha,
‘DissemiNation: time, narrative, and the margins of the modern nation’ in Homi K. Bhabha, ed. Nation and
narration (New York: Routledge, 1990): 291-322. I put the phrase ‘we moderns’ in scare quotes as a reminder
that the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is not as clear-cut as might be imagined. To put it in Taylor’s
idiom, the immanent frame does not include everyone.
36 Benedict Anderson, Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism, Rev. Ed.
(London: Verso, 1991), 23. See Walter Benjamin, Illuminations (London: Fontana, 1973), 263.
37 See the quote by Erich Auerbach in Anderson, 23-4.
38 Casanova, Public Religions, 14.
39 See Taylor, 265-6.
40 Masuzawa, 19.
41 See Masuzawa, 15. The application of traditional secularization theory to regions outside Christendom is
inherently problematic. As David Martin notes, ‘in so far as one uses classical secularization theory to characterize
Islam as undeveloped with respect to internalization, privatization, pluralism and democracy, one is using precisely
the criteria which derive from Western developments and the Gestalt initiated by the Reformation and the
Enlightenment. One is also ignoring the huge variety of possibilities within contemporary Islam.’Martin, 64.
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histories and ancient literature, the latter focused on the practices of ‘primitive cultures,’ e.g.,
the ‘tribal societies’ of Africa, the Americas, and Oceania, which were understood to have
no writing, and so no history. Both categories of people were presumed to be more religious
than Westerners, but the forms of religious life differed; great civilizations had world
religions, whereas tribal societies knew only ‘primitive religion.’42
Pluralism as a Response to Secularization
The orientalist fascination with non-Western cultures that emerged as the reverse side of
Europe's new secular self-understanding had unintended consequences. In the first place,
it seemed to relativize Christianity, cutting it down to size as one possibility among
others—aworld religion rather than theworld religion. As Ernst Troeltsch put the point in
his 1897 essay ‘Christianity and the history of religion,’ ‘Christianity lost its exclusive-
supernatural foundation. It was now perceived as only one of the great world religions,
along with Islam and Buddhism, and like these, as constituting the culmination of
complicated historical developments.’43 In addition, the development of post-Christian
ideologies and the prospect of religious decline threatened the Durkheimian link between
Christianity and the community from within. In this way, the very processes of secular-
ization that allowed subtraction theorists to portray the West as an advanced civilization
seemed to present a serious challenge to the hegemony of Western Christianity.
In response to these anxieties, Troeltsch and other Protestant theologians in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries developed new ways of thinking and talking
about religious differences. Their solution, as Masuzawa shows in her book The
invention of world religions, was the pluralistic affirmation of religion as such over
against secularism, which allowed them to enlist the world religions on the side of
Christianity, rather than viewing them as ideological competitors. 44 If religion is a
human universal, then Christianity can be vindicated as a particular (though not unique)
instance of the more general phenomenon. What began as a discourse of othering was
in this way folded into a discourse of assimilation,45 hence the subtitle of Masuzawa's
book: How European universalism was preserved in the language of pluralism. As she
puts it, ‘the new discourse of pluralism and diversity of religions…neither displaced nor
disabled the logic of European hegemony—formerly couched in the language of the
universality of Christianity—but, in a way, gave it a new lease.’46
The success of this new apologetic strategy depended on being able to relativize the
differences among the religions and to emphasize their continuities. This meant positing an
essence to religion behind the variety—a common thread linking Christianity with the other
42 The term her is used in singular form to signal the fact that the ‘religions’ of primitive cultures were not
thought to vary greatly.
43 Ernst Troeltsch, ‘Christianity and the history of religion.’ Quoted by Masuzawa, 312.
44 See Masuzawa, 312ff.
45 Or more precisely: the discourse bifurcated. Today, the secular-religious distinction continues to function as
part of a politics of exclusion – e.g., toward Muslims in Western countries. Casanova writes, ‘It is the secular
identity shared by European elites and ordinary people alike that paradoxically turns religion and the barely
submerged Christian European identity into a thorny and perplexing issue, when it comes to delimiting the
external geographic boundaries and to defining the internal cultural identity of a European Union in the
process of being constituted.’ Casanova, ‘Immigration and the New Religious Pluralism,’ 144.
46 Masuzawa, xiv.
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‘great traditions’ and enabling us to distinguish religion from irreligion, genuine religion
from superstition, and the world religions from lesser traditions (variously described as
‘primitive,’ ‘primal,’ ‘tribal,’ or ‘preaxial’). In practice, of course, identifying an essence was
a matter of creation rather than discovery, which involved forming other world religions in
the image and likeness of Christianity. The supposedly universal features singled out for
comparison—foundational texts (rather than living practitioners), conceptions of the divine
(rather than ritual), etc.—reflected the preoccupations of Protestant theology; anything not
exhibiting these markers was, by definition, not a genuine world religion.
The template was not, however, Christianity in all its messy and disputed materiality,
but an idealized, secularized Christianity—disenchanted, socially differentiated and
privatized, disciplined by Reform, and sensitized to the criticisms of its cultured despisers.
Pluralism was the work of theological elites, and though Protestantism supplied the
prototype, pluralism improved upon it. This entailed rejecting as inessential precisely
those dimensions of other traditions that were deemed susceptible to secularist critique—
that is to say, those features of other religions that Western theologians found most
embarrassing about their own. As Mark Heim has observed, ‘It is hardly an accident that
pluralistic theology, in its definition and treatment of the religions, takes care to inoculate
them against just those objections theologians in theWest have found so troubling.’47 That
the world religions were constructed so as to correct for perceived vulnerabilities in
historical Christianity allows them to maintain a delicate balance between exoticized
otherness and familiar sameness—not unlike so-called ‘ethnic’ cuisine adapted toWestern
tastes. Moreover, since the world religions are seen as ultimately compatible with one
another—as different but not incommensurable—their various flavors can be sampled
without abandoning the comforts of one's home tradition.
Nevertheless, it would be inadequate simply to dismiss the world religions as figments
of theWestern imagination. Under the weight of European imperialism, life was breathed,
through a process of appropriation by non-Westerners, into the projections of Western
elites. During the nineteenth century, for example, Indian intellectuals fashioned a new
identity for themselves, drawing freely on orientalist motifs. ‘According to their projective
view, “Hinduism,” though the term itself may be a neologism, refers to the ancient faith of
India, a religion that was originally and essentially monotheistic, and whose ancient
wisdom is encapsulated in certain select but voluminous canonical texts…’ 48 As
Timothy Fitzgerald observes, ‘[t]he onus was largely on the local representative of the
indige[n]ous culture to prove…that these forms of life were genuine religions, that is
soteriologies based on an awareness of God or some equivalent transcendental object and
advocating moral precepts acceptable to westerners…’ 49 Yet, to reject the resulting
constructions as inauthentic distortions—as some Western scholars appear to do—would
be a mistake.50 Against a backdrop of colonial power and European prejudice, develop-
ments that might at first appear to be mere capitulations to colonialism can also be
interpreted as forms of resistance by the colonized. As Brian Pennington notes, the too
simplistic thesis ‘that Britain invented Hinduism grants altogether too much power to
colonialism: it both mystifies and magnifies colonial means of domination and erases
47 S. Mark Heim, Salvations: truth and difference in religion (Mryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1995), 108.
48 Masuzawa, 283.
49 Timothy Fitzgerald, The ideology of religious studies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 31.
50 It would also, ironically, reinscribe the claim by Western scholars to understand non-Western traditions
better than do their practitioners.
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Hindu agency and creativity.’51 By living into the constructions of Westerners, but also
subverting and exploiting them in subtle ways, Indian elites like Swami Vivekananda,
who introduced Vedanta to Americans at the first World's Parliament of Religions, were
able to claim for Hinduism—once categorized under the rubric of ‘paganism’—the
privileges reserved by the West for world religions.52
That the pluralist paradigm had acquired a life of its own was evident when the
Parliament convened in Chicago in 1893. On September 11 of that year, according to
Richard Hughes Seager, ‘the Columbian Liberty Bell in the Court of Honor of the World's
Columbian Exposition tolled ten times to honor what were a century ago considered the
world's ten great religions: Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Zoroastrianism, Taoism,
Confucianism, Shintoism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.’ 53 More than 60 religious
leaders, representing the ‘great traditions,’ assembled to greet what Seager calls ‘the dawn
of religious pluralism.’ The purpose of the parliament, as Charles Carroll Bonney reminded
the delegates in his opening address, was ‘to unite all Religion against all irreligion; to make
the golden rule the basis of this union; and to present to the world the substantial unity of
many religions in the good deeds of the religious life.’54 Here, we can witness in their
infancy rhetorical moves that anticipate those of many contemporary interfaith movements:
the invocation of Religion—here capitalized—against secularism; the bringing together of
elites to ‘represent’ religion's major taxa; the quest for a global ‘religious ethic’; and the
harnessing of religion's moral energies to the cause of global progress.
It is notable that the World's Parliament of Religions was held in conjunction with the
World's Columbian Exposition—the nation's celebration of the 400th anniversary of
Columbus's arrival in the Americas. The development of the pluralistic paradigm can
be understood as both an outgrowth of and as colluding in Western expansionism. As we
saw earlier, a secular age is characterized, on Taylor's account, not by the absence of belief
but by a diversity of ‘options.’However, one weakness of Taylor's analysis, in my view, is
that it pays inadequate attention to the ways in which colonialism and neocolonialism (in
the guise of neoliberal globalization) have contributed to this proliferation of possibilities.
55 These colonial encounters had the effect not simply of bringing new religious
possibilities to European awareness but also of commodifying these possibilities as
consumer items for Western markets. So conceived—as ‘“brands” of a common
51 Brian Pennington,Was Hinduism invented? Britons, Indians, and the colonial construction of religion (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 5. Today, many millions of people self-identify as ‘Hindu’; to write
contemporary Hinduism off as inauthentic only adds insult to injury by ironically perpetuating the orientalist
claim to know the tradition better than its practitioners. Of course, one need not uncritically accept the claims
of Hindutva, e.g., that Hinduism is the world's oldest religion.
52 Referring to Vivekananda’s enthusiastic reception at the Parliament, Diana Eck writes, ‘Perhaps America’s own
burgeoning universalist spirit was eager to hear that spirit echoed by a youngHindu reformer from the other side of the
world.’ Diana L. Eck, A new religious America: how a ‘Christian Country’ has become the world’s most religiously
diverse nation (New York: HarperCollins, 2001), 97. My own view is slightly more skeptical.
53 RichardHughes Seager, Introduction toPart I,The dawnof religious pluralism: voices from theworld’s parliament of
religions, 1893, ed. Seager (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1993), 15. Note that Sikhism had not yet made the list.
54 Charles Carroll Bonney, ‘Words of welcome,’ in The dawn of religious pluralism, p. 21.
55 As Charles Long has observed, the changes wrought within the cultures of colonizers as a result of contact
with colonized peoples are frequently downplayed, because the ‘signifiers’—his term for those in positions of
rhetorical privilege—tend to ‘explain all changes as modes of development and evolution of ideational and
historical clusters of meaning’ already latent within the signifiers’ own cultures ‘that have come to fruition in
the modern period.’ Charles H. Long, Significations: signs, symbols, and images in the interpretation of
religion (Aurora, Co.: The Davies Group, 1986), 6.
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product’—the world religions pose little threat to regnant political and economic orders.
56 As Masuzawa notes, ‘One of the most consequential effects of this discourse is that it
spiritualizes what are material practices and turns them into expressions of something
timeless and suprahistorical, which is to say, it depoliticizes them.’57
This process of privatization, commodification, and assimilation has fundamentally
altered the relationship of Christianity to other traditions. The distinctive feature of the so-
called world religions is that they are options within, rather than alternatives to, Western
culture. By contrast, pluralist Christianity is not always a possibility within other cultural
horizons: witness the typically unrequited appropriation by Westerners of Kabbalah,
Sufism, yoga, Zen meditation, Feng Shui, the Dalai Lama, etc. The effect of this
asymmetry is a kind of missionary project in reverse; instead of attempting to impose
itself on alien cultures, pluralistic Christian theology draws these cultures—or suitably
repackaged versions of them—into its own orbit. While permitting the validation of other
perspectives, it nevertheless retains its ideological hegemony by supplying the framework
within which these perspectives are organized and evaluated. If the world religions are
consumer products, pluralism controls the means of production. Today, Western fantasies
of non-Western religious authenticity intersect with non-Western adaptive strategies in
curious ways; while Western practitioners of Zen Buddhism meditate on tatami mats,
many Japanese–Americans sit on pews and sing hymns in Buddhist ‘churches.’
Understandably, this emerging conception of religion bore within its optimistic shell
the seeds of future resentment. The same pressures that forged the world religions also
helped to galvanize those distinctly modern social movements which—again extrapo-
lating from Christianity—we call ‘fundamentalisms.’ If mimesis and adaptation repre-
sent one path to empowerment for non-Western religious movements, nativism and
resistance represent another; only the moral valences are switched. It is precisely those
ostensibly religious dimensions of culture that defy Western appropriation—so-called
traditional women's roles, for instance—that nativists seize upon as most ‘authentic.’
Given the benign constructions they have imposed on the data, pluralists have been
particularly ill prepared to understand these developments, which they tend to attribute
to religion's having been ‘hijacked’ by political forces external to itself, little realizing
that religion and politics cannot so neatly be disintricated.
Hick's Pluralistic Hypothesis
It is within the trajectory marked out in the preceding pages that I would like to locate
John Hick's magnum opus, An interpretation of religion: human responses to the
transcendent, which developed out of the Gifford lectures he gave in 1986–1987. In
the well-known book, Hick advances what he calls ‘the pluralistic hypothesis,’ i.e., the
claim that ‘the great post-axial faiths constitute different ways of experiencing, conceiv-
ing and living in relation to an ultimate divine Reality which transcends all our varied
visions of it.’ Hick calls this divine reality ‘the Real.’ Drawing a quasi-Kantian distinc-
56 Heim, 110.
57 Masuzawa, 20.
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tion between things as they are in themselves and those same things as we experience them,
he argues that although the Real an sich is ineffable, it can variously be represented as a
personal deity or an impersonal Absolute, depending on the culture. For instance, God
(though conceived as ultimate within Christianity) and Brahman (though conceived as
ultimate within certain forms of Hinduism) are simply ‘different manifestations of the truly
Ultimate within different streams of human thought-and-experience.’ 58 For Hick, ‘the
divine noumenon is a necessary postulate of the pluralistic religious life of humanity.’59
How does Hick arrive at this conclusion? What problem is it meant to solve? Hick
begins his argument with the observation that we live in a ‘religiously ambiguous’
world, one which ‘evokes and sustains non-religious as well as religious responses.’60
In face of this ambiguity, the religious believer (no less than the religious skeptic) is
entitled to trust her or his own experience:
[I]n the absence of any positive reason to distrust one's experience—and the mere
fact that in this religiously ambiguous universe a different, naturalistic, epistemic
practice is also possible does not constitute such a reason—it is rational, sane,
reasonable for those whose religious experience strongly leads them to do so to
believe wholeheartedly in the reality of God.61
But here, Hick suggests that a difficulty arises: the very same argument he has been
using to show that Christians can be justified on the basis of their experiences in
believing in God can be deployed to show that other people with different experiences
can be justified in believing in things that seem to be incompatible with God. ‘Thus,’ he
writes, ‘those who report the advaitic experience of oneness with Brahman, or who
experience in the ego-less state of Nirvana the reality of the eternal Buddha-nature, or
who are conscious of the “emptiness” of all things as their fullness of “wondrous being,”
are entitled to base their belief-systems on those forms of experience.’62 It will not do,
Hick maintains, to ‘claim that our own form of experience, together with that of the
tradition of which we are a part, is veridical whilst the others are not,’ since this would
amount to a violation of ‘the intellectual Golden Rule of granting to others a premise on
which we rely ourselves.’ 63 It is at this point that Hick introduces the pluralistic
hypothesis as the only satisfying way of accounting (‘religiously’) for the varieties of
religious experience; his conclusion is that the incompatibilities among the various
religions are merely apparent and that each tradition is, in fact, oriented around the
same noumenal religious object variously encountered in the phenomenal world.
I rehearse these arguments not because I find them compelling—I do not—but
because they nicely illustrate the pluralistic apologetic I have been describing. The first
thing to notice about them is that they frame the path to religious commitment as in
effect involving two choices: the first between religion and naturalism and the second
among the ‘great religions.’ These options can be conceived on the model of a decision
tree; it is only when one has opted against naturalism that one is confronted with the
58 Hick, 249, italics added.
59 Hick, 249.
60 Hick, 74.
61 Hick, 221.
62 Hick, 228.
63 Hick, 235.
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plurality of religions. On this construal, the choice between religion and irreligion is
logically prior to the choice among the religions and requires ‘a cognitive decision in
face of an intrinsically ambiguous universe.’64 The term Hick uses to describe the
‘choice’ to experience the world religiously is ‘faith.’ He writes, ‘[T]his fundamental
option occurs at the deeper level of the cognitive choice whereby we come to
experience in either a religious or a non-religious way.’65
The second observation to make is that Hick's argument against religious exclusiv-
ism, i.e., the view that ‘our own form of religious experience, together with that of the
tradition of which we are a part, is veridical whilst the others are not,’66 begs a rather
important question. This becomes apparent if we ask why the kind of grounds on which
the person of faith is entitled to reject naturalism do not also permit, e.g., the Christian
to reject Buddhism, or vice versa. Recall that when defending the rationality of faith,
Hick had argued that ‘the mere fact that in this religiously ambiguous universe a
different, naturalistic, epistemic practice is also possible’ does not constitute a reason
to distrust one's religious experience, and that in the absence of compelling reasons for
doubt, it is ‘rational, sane, reasonable for those whose religious experience strongly
leads them to do so to believe wholeheartedly in the reality of God.’67 But if naturalistic
responses to the world do not give the religious believer reason to doubt, why should
the existence of alternative religious responses constitute an objection to religious
exclusivism?68 If, for example, a Christian has had experiences that lead her to believe
in God, but not experiences that lead her to believe in Nirvana, and if it seems to her (on
the basis of her total experience) that belief in God is incompatible with belief in
Nirvana, then why is she not entitled to believe that experiences of Nirvana must not
be veridical? It would seem that the exclusivist would be entitled to reject the veridicality
of alternative religious experiences and the truth of alternative religious beliefs on
precisely the same kind of grounds that Hick says entitle us to reject beliefs about
‘witchcraft, astrology, or alchemy, or the existence of extra-galactic intelligences con-
trolling our minds through rays, or the demonic causation of disease,’ namely, that they
fail ‘to cohere with what we believe on the basis of our experience as a whole.’69 Hick's
verdict with respect to the latter beliefs would appear to apply in the religious case as
well—that ‘although we may recognize that people of other cultures have reasonably
held these beliefs, nevertheless we shall not feel obliged to hold them ourselves; indeed
we may on the contrary feel obliged to reject them.’70 Hick's argument in favor of
religious pluralism seems to depend on the premise that belief in God does not actually
contradict belief in Nirvana. But since that is precisely the conclusion he is attempting to
prove, to assume it from the outset is to beg the entire question against the exclusivist.
My aim here is not to defend exclusivism, but to point up an inconsistency in Hick's
argument for the pluralistic hypothesis—one required by the two-story structure I
described a moment ago. This two-stage presentation—sometimes construed in terms
64 Hick, 159.
65 Hick, 159.
66 Hick, 235.
67 Hick, 221.
68 The question here is not the sociological/psychological question explored by Berger and others of whether
plurality weakens religious confidence and vitality.
69 Hick, 219.
70 Hick, 219.
492 R. Amesbury
of a distinction between faith and belief71—is central to the pluralist polemic against
secularism. Its rhetorical effect is to simplify what is otherwise rather messy by insisting
that there is only one kind of difference that matters—that between religion and its
antithesis—rather than many. Unlike in the case of the various religions, each of which
represents a valid and salvific interpretation of the Real, the issue between faith and
naturalism is ‘ultimately a factual one in which the rival worldviews are subject to
eventual experiential confirmation or disconfirmation.’72 But once one acknowledges
the inconsistency of treating the ‘choice’ (to use Hick's term) against, say, Buddhism
differently than the choice against naturalism, the second story of Hick's edifice
collapses into the first, and one is faced with a ‘choice’ not simply between religion
and naturalism, or among the ‘great religions,’ but among all of these (and a variety of
other) possibilities, with the notable exception of religion conceived generally. In other
words, without the two-stage structure, religion cannot be treated as a single (if
internally differentiated) option contrastable with naturalism.
Over the past two decades, Hick's pluralistic hypothesis has been criticized not only
by ‘exclusivists’ like Alvin Plantinga and Peter van Inwagen, who argue that it assumes
more than Hick's arguments warrant, but also by theologians like John Cobb and Mark
Heim, who contend that it does not go far enough; insofar, as it presupposes a single
religious object and a single conception of salvation, the pluralistic hypothesis seems
curiously un-pluralistic. On Hick's account, the world religions are finally to be
celebrated not because of their differences, but in spite of them. My claim is that this
is not simply an oversight; rather, it is motivated by the underlying logic of the
pluralistic defense against irreligion. Here, then, we can begin to see how Hick's
ostensible pluralism is in fact encouraged by distinctively Christian concerns about
secularization in the West. It is at bottom an apologetic project, as Hick readily admits,
73 and the challenges to which it responds are distinctively Western in origin. That this
is so can be clarified further by taking another look at Hick's discussion of the world's
‘religious ambiguity.’74
Careful examination reveals that Hick's use of the concept of ambiguity is itself
rather ambiguous. On the one hand, he suggests that the universe ‘is religiously
ambiguous in that it is capable of being interpreted intellectually and experientially in
both religious and naturalistic ways.’75 This way of putting the point implies that some
people experience it one way, and others experience it the other way; some believe in
71 See, e.g., Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Faith and belief (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979).
72 Hick, 13.
73 See Hick 9. The social location from and for which Hick writes can further be clarified by interrogating the
way he uses the first-person plural pronoun at crucial junctures, as for example, when he writes, in a quotation
cited a moment ago, that belief in witchcraft and the demonic causation of disease ‘fails to cohere with what
we believe on the basis of our experience as a whole’: who is this ‘we,’ anyway? Plainly, it does not include
many of the world's current inhabitants, including a good many Americans, who seem to detect no such
incoherence.
74 In earlier writings, Hick had appealed to religious ambiguity in the context of theodicy. In these works, the
world's religious ambiguity is a function of the ‘epistemic distance’ required for human freedom; an
ambiguous world is precisely the kind that God would want to create in order to ensure that humans have
the possibility of freely responding. Hick's later work appears to take over this earlier conception of the world
as religiously ambiguous, but to situate it in the context of a rather different epistemology. Here ‘religious
ambiguity is a special case of the general fact that our environment is capable of being construed—in sense
perception as well as ethically and religiously—in a range of ways’ Hick, 12.
75 Hick, 129.
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God, for instance, and some do not. This much is uncontroversial. But Hick proceeds in
the same paragraph to remark that ‘ideally, the religious person should, even whilst
experiencing and living in the world religiously, be able to acknowledge its theoreti-
cally equivocal character; and the same holds vice versa for the non-religious person.’76
On this interpretation, it is not simply that some see the world one way and others the
other way, but that everyone should be able to see it both ways. It seems plain,
however, that many people do not see it both ways. In fact, Hick admits this. For
instance, he notes that for premodern people, ‘the reality of the transcendent was
accepted as manifest fact, unquestioned except by an occasional boldly skeptical
philosopher.’77 He also acknowledges that in the contemporary world, ‘the skeptics
have mostly been secularized Christians and Jews or post-Christian and post-Jewish
Marxists,’ and that ‘[d]istinctively post-Hindu, post-Buddhist and post-Muslim forms
of skepticism have yet to arise.’78 Indeed, it is worth noting in this connection that the
world is not particularly religiously ambiguous to the skeptics themselves; Sam Harris
and Richard Dawkins are no less confident in their views than were the premoderns.
So for whom is the universe religiously ambiguous? Hick's answer seems to be that
it is experienced in this way primarily by modern Christians and Jews in the West.
Indeed, the chapters dealing with the world's ostensibly ‘seamless cloak of religious
ambiguity’ focus entirely on arguments for and against the existence of God, as these
have arisen in Western philosophy.79 In other words, a distinctively modern problem in
the West—the question of God's reality—is here being universalized into a general
thesis about the universe itself; that it is not universally experienced as ambiguous only
goes to show that not everyone has (yet) grasped its true nature.
I do not deny that the world can be experienced as ambiguous; I experience it that
way myself. But ambiguity is in the eye of the beholder. To put the point in Taylor's
terms, the world is experienced as religiously ambiguous by those within the immanent
frame, for whom the frame remains at least slightly open. Those outside the immanent
frame, such as premodern Westerners or perhaps some in non-Westernized cultures, or
for whom the frame is closed to all forms of transcendence, such as Dawkins, do not
seem to experience the world in this way. To insist, as Hick does, that the latter have
failed to grasp a general truth—as though the world's religious ambiguity were
analogous to the earth's sphericity—is simply to project ahistorically one's own episte-
mic situation onto others.
Challenges for Philosophy of Religion: a Mini-Manifesto
I wish that I could draw from the preceding remarks a tidy conclusion but must confess to
having more questions than answers. What I shall attempt to offer instead are three
interrelated ethical challenges for those of us who, while suspicious of the ideology of world
religions, remain interested in something resembling pluralistic philosophy of religion.
76 Hick, 129.
77 Hick, 73.
78 Hick, 74.
79 Hick, 114.
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The first is to engage other points of view without colonizing them. The cultural and
religious landscape inwhichmost of us live andwork is changing inways that philosophers
of religion can ill afford to ignore. Not only is it becoming more diverse, but attitudes
toward diversity are changing. For some, this means that the repertoire of available ‘options’
is expanding, but I think it would be a mistake to generalize this observation. As I have tried
to indicate, the relation of pluralist Christianity to other perspectives is often asymmetrical.
These differences are especially salient in the case of immigrant and minority communities
struggling to maintain collective identities in the face of powerful mechanisms for assimi-
lation. From this perspective, the suggestion that ‘all religions’ are equally valid—with its
implication that differences of belief and practice are of no real importance—is likely to be
perceived as a threat to the distinctiveness and integrity of their own communities. Without
careful attention to the dynamics by which religious identities are constructed and differ-
ences assimilated, otherwise well-meaning pluralists risk becoming gatekeepers for
American denominationalism, custodians of civil religion.80 Engagement with integrity will
require greater sensitivity to imbalances of power and access in what passes for ‘interreli-
gious dialogue,’ as well as to the various ‘vertical’ registers of power that the ‘flat,’ lateral
delineation of world religions obscures.81
Nor can we assume that such dialogue will take place within a shared context of
secularity. Taylor has argued that ‘the immanent frame is common to all of us in the
modernWest,’ but on this point I think he is mistaken.82 For reasons I have already alluded
to—including colonialism, economic globalization, and global migration—the ‘modern
West’ is not the end product of an autonomous tradition, but the site of confluence of many
streams of cultural transmission. The diversity characteristic of any major American or
European city is a result not simply of internal fragmentation within Western culture but
also of the West's contact with non-Western cultures through both inward migration and
outward expansion. If theWest is taken to denote, among other things, a quasi-geographical
space, however porous and elastic its borders, then the diversity that characterizes it today
surely includes a good many outside the immanent frame. Immanence may be typical of
one kind of modernity, but there are multiple modernities.
One reason other forms of life tend to escape our notice is precisely because the
discourse of world religions conceals them. Pluralism is defined as much by what it
excludes as by what it includes. Indeed, the ‘major traditions’ affirmed by contempo-
rary pluralism are nearly identical to those investigated by nineteenth-century oriental-
ism, from which, after all, pluralism inherited its typology. The language of ‘major’ or
great traditions should alert us to the presence of hierarchies of power and status even
within the pluralist paradigm. As J. Z. Smith has noted, ‘AWorld Religion is a religion
like ours; but it is, above all, a tradition which has achieved sufficient power and
numbers to enter our history, either to form it, interact with it, or thwart it. All other
religions are invisible.’83 In a similar vein, Charles Long observes, ‘More often than
80 Though disestablished and contested on virtually every side, liberal Protestantism retains considerable
privilege in American public life, which means that, in seeking to affirm the validity of other religions,
traditionally Protestant schools of theology run a similar risk of taking on the role of accrediting agencies for
non-Christian traditions.
81 I have in mind here class, race, gender, sexuality, etc.
82 Taylor, 543.
83 Jonathan Z. Smith, Map is not territory: studies in the history of religions (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1993 [1978]), 295.
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not, the differences that bring a culture or a people to the attention of the investigator
are not simply formed from the point of view of the intellectual problematic; they are
more often than not the nuances and latencies of that power which is part of the
structure of the cultural contact itself manifesting itself as intellectual curiosity.’84
Moreover, even among those perspectives the existence of which pluralism acknowl-
edges, there are two that lie beyond the limits of its otherwise capacious embrace. On one
side is secularism—for it is this over against which religion is defined and defended—and
on the other are those ‘exclusivist’ forms of Christianity that pluralism claims to super-
sede. That even pluralism requires exclusions serves to remind us that there is no view of
culture from above, no perspective on diversity that does not contribute to it.
A second challenge for philosophers of religion is, thus, to respect conceptual
differences without pretending to be neutral. Some scholars of religion attempt to
‘bracket’ questions of value in the interests of morally and theologically disinterested
description, but whatever its merits in the social sciences—and these are debated by
social scientists themselves—the epoché clearly will not do in normative disciplines
like philosophy, theology, and ethics. To bracket evaluative questions would be to set
aside the very subjects and methods that define these disciplines.
If we are honest, we will admit that diversity can be celebrated only within limits.
This is not merely a moral or political point but a logical one; real cultural and religious
diversity involves incompatibility, and respect for conceptual differences precludes
assigning equal value to everything. Like a jigsaw puzzle that has had some extra
pieces mixed in, there are more possibilities on the table than will fit neatly into a single
frame or form a coherent picture. As Raimundo Panikkar has repeatedly stressed, ‘[a]
pluralistic system would be a contradiction in terms.’85 There is more in heaven and on
earth than can be contained in any philosophy; if it could all be reconciled and
systematized, there would be no differences left to celebrate.
Here we encounter a third challenge, namely, to allow our self-understandings to be
tested by what they exclude. All evaluation is perspectival, but perspectives can be
enlarged. The recognition that diversity can be celebrated only within limits need not
issue in exclusivism or narrow-minded self-satisfaction. Indeed, it is only when the
other is allowed to be itself that it can challenge the (sometimes politicized) limits of
our present thinking. Instead of constructing a ‘respectable’ other, we must allow the
other to test our criteria of respectability; domesticated differences neither present any
serious threat nor provide any opportunity for growth.
The encounter with otherness is often painful, and ‘celebration’ is not always the
right word to describe what transpires; incompatibility, after all, is the stuff of tragedy.
Sorrow and repentance are often in order. Yet, I remain convinced that serious
engagement, undertaken soberly and alert to the subtle relationship of knowledge to
power, is well worth the effort. In any case, the choice is not whether to engage, but
how; in today's globalized world, engagement can be done well or badly, but it cannot
be avoided.
84 Long, 5.
85 Raimundo Panikkar, ‘The Jordan, the Tiber, and the Ganges: three kairological moments of Christic self-
consciousness,’ in The myth of Christian uniqueness: toward a pluralistic theology of religions, ed. John Hick
and Paul F. Knitter (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1987), 109.
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